in the growth of the City's population or a chapter in the development of municipal services. The design and construction of the Aqueduct is also noted as one of the remarkable technical accomplishments of 19th-century engineering. The Croton Aqueduct is usually thus described as an example of an innovative technology and as a response to the needs of an expanding urban population.^ This urban-centered view of the history of the Aqueduct has neglected its impact on Westchester County. The construction of the Croton Aqueduct, independent of the service it provided New York, was a turning point in the history of Westchester County in the 19th-century; in conjunction with the railroad, it radically trans- formed Westchester's relationship with New York City. The decade of the 1840s, bracketed by the collapse of the first Croton Dam in 1841 and the completion of the Hudson River Railroad in 1851, fixed the suburban nature of the County and solidified the 42 urban-rural nexus of New York and Westchester. The history of the building of Croton Aqueduct reminds us of the value of water, one of the most important rural resources in the 19th century, and the ways it had become an invaluable commodity for urban populations and allied commercial interests. The premi- um attached to this rural resource was so high that cities and state legislatures were prepared to use their political power and commit their financial resources to overcome the reticence about public improvement schemes and get control of available water supplies. In the building of the Aqueduct, Westchester residents had to artic- ulate and defend their interests in the ensuing battle with a city in desperate need of water.^ In July 1798 Dr. Joseph Browne, an engineer, first proposed that New York City go beyond its political boundaries for its water supply.^ The Collect Pond, which along with the old Colles Wells, was the principal source of the City's water, Browne declared to be "a large stagnant, filthy pond," far too small for New York's needs. He proposed turning to the Bronx River as a new source, damming the River at West Farms and constructing a canal and tunnel to car- ry the water into Morrisiana Creek and across the Harlem River. Several alternate schemes were advanced by others who saw the opportunities to profit from New York's desperate need for water if they could get a charter from the City. In 1821 the New York Sharon Canal Company proposed to use the Housatanic River in Connecticut as part of a canal scheme which would connect Sharon, Connecticut, with the Hudson River and could double as a water supply canal for New York City.'' Indeed the successful devel- opment of transportation canals provided the conceptual precedent for the thinking about aqueducts and urban water systems.^ The Sharon Canal project got nowhere. In 1824 Canvass White, one of the engineers on the Erie Canal, presented a plan to the Common Council for tapping the Bronx River, which he described as an adequate source for the City. Again little was done. Finally in 1830 the first proposal for the use of the Croton watershed was made by Francis B. Phelps.® But like most of the earlier proposals this plan got bogged down in the City Council. New York paid a high price for its failure to act; between 1829 and 1832 fires and cholera took lives and cost money. The cholera of 1832 was attributed to the City's reliance on well water.^ These catastrophes made it difficult for politicians to avoid the issue any longer. Colonel De Witt Clinton, Jr., a civil engineer and the son of Governor De Witt Clinton, expressed this sense of urgency when he reported to the Fire and Water Committee of the Common Council in December 1832 his surprise and regret that "there should exist any hesitation to grant her power to obtain an element so essen- tially connected with the ... health ... of her citizens."* But Clinton saw this not only as a health issue but one of "pros- perity and comfort," as well. He criticized the State's legislative pro- crastination in empowering the City. Nothing, he argued, should stand in the way of New York's pre-eminence if the City was to "be to this country what London was to England."^ Pre-eminence had dire implications for the neighboring regions. The rural community or region which is the source of this precious natural resource will not only find itself under severe pressure to yield but will face a future in which a growing city will have a legitimate claim for more water. In 1825 Governor De Witt Clinton hinted at the inevitability of this development when he stated that, "It may be laid down as an incon- trovertible truth that no dense population can furnish from within its