[Frederic Shonnard & W.W. Spooner (1900)] assisted by the militia of the section through which he passed; but what were the intentions of Howe with his large New York com-mand? Would he co-operate with Burgoyne by ascending the Hud-son River? If so, would he use all his forces to that end, or only a portion, employing the remainder for an expedition by sea against Philadelphia or Boston? The more Washington studied the problem, the more he became convinced that in any event an attempt up the Hudson would follow. On the other hand, he could not bring his mind to believe that this would be the only thing undertaken by Howe. He soon rejected the idea of a possible attack on Boston, and came to the firm conclusion that Philadelphia was the point in view. In this he was strengthened by a decoy letter, which Howe allowed to fall into the hands of Putnam at Peekskill, announcing that the army at New York would be dispatched to take Boston. The ruse was too transparent, and Washington made all his arrangements on EVENTS OF 1777 AND 1778 431 the theory of a double design on the Highlands and Philadelphia. His calculations proved entirely correct. His first care was to strengthen Putnam at Peekskill. He sent thither two brigades, commanded by Parsons and Yarinim, and later General Sullivan with his division, also ordering Generals George Clinton and Putnam to call out more militia; and meantime for-warded troops and artillery to re-enforce the Northern Army.