[Frederic Shonnard & W.W. Spooner (1900)] If this is true, the re-enforcements came just in the nick of time— not, it is true, for Burgoyne's salvation, but for a judicious attack in the Highland quarter. When Sir Henry was prepared to move, Burgoyne was already doomed. On the other hand, if Sir Henry had moved a month earlier, when he might have boon of real service to Burgoyne, he would have boon confronted by a formidable instead of an insignifi-cant force at Peekskill, and probably would have been baffled. His re enforcements could not have been large— could hardly have been worth waiting for, indeed,— since he took with him only 3,000 men. It seems to us that an important con-tributing reason, if not the chief reason, for his delay was a discreet resolve to wait until Washington, battling against great odds around Philadelphia, should, by his emergent necessities, summon to his own army the better part of Putnam's com-mand at Peekskill, and thus leave the Highlands in as weak a condition as possible. The facts are that he did not move until Washington had been reduced to such straits as to take to himself 2,500 of Putnam's best troops, — but did move shortly after-ward.